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Antenuptial agreements are made by prospective spouses in
1
contemplation and consideration of marriage. They showed up in
our legal system in the sixteenth century when couples used them
in attempts to alter the incidents of the legal marital property
2
regime. The validity of these agreements was then uncertain. They
3
were thus the subject of litigation. Now, 400 years later, couples
are still using antenuptial agreements to alter the incidents of the
marital property regime, their validity is still uncertain and they are
still the subject of litigation.
I have addressed antenuptial agreements as a genre twice
4
before and revisit them now, ten years later, to see how they fare.
† Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family Law.
My thanks to Elizabeth K. Lee ’03 for her help with this paper.
1. See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1), 9B U.L.A. 371 (1983 &
Supp. 2001). These are sometimes called “premarital” or “prenuptial”
agreements.
2. Both chancery and common law courts were passing on their validity. 5
SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 310-12 (3rd ed. 1945).
3. Id.
4. Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L.

697

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001

1

06_FORMAT.YOUNGER.10.12.01.DOC

698

11/1/2001 6:00 PM

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 8
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

Part I of this article is an introduction; it describes the typical
antenuptial agreement, the dilemma these agreements present for
the law and the special rules of fairness developed for assessing
their validity. Part II is a review of the cases decided by the highest
state courts in the last ten years. Part III is a brief discussion of the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and the ALI Principles of
Family Dissolution. Finally, Part IV is the Conclusion which
discusses drafting for validity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s garden-variety antenuptial agreement is made between
5
6
engaged parties on the eve of marriage. The parties are in a
7
confidential relationship, likely to be of unequal bargaining
8
9
power and in less than rational states. They are thus ripe for
overreaching and prone to making bad bargains. The purpose of
their agreement is to alter the state-prescribed marital property
regime which would otherwise apply to them when the marriage
10
ends. The agreement, thus, deals with matters of great interest
and importance to the state: property division, support, elective or
REV. 1059 (1988); Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An
Update, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 1 (1992).
5. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “engaged” to mean: “That is
under a promise to marry; betrothed.” 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 248 (2d ed.
1991).
6. Literally, in too many cases. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §7.05 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4
2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
7. E.g., Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Nev. 1992); Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994); Estate of Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d
1343, 1346-47 (Utah 1994).
8. See Marriage of Bonds v. Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817 (Cal. 2000) (concerning
husband who was a major league baseball player and foreign, unemployed wife);
McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85, 94 (La. 1996) (Justice Johnson concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (concerning husband who was attorney); Randolph v.
Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. 1996) (concerning husband who was
successful real estate businessman owning assets amounting to approximately
$800,000 while wife owned virtually no assets); Beesley, 883 P.2d at 1345
(concerning husband who owned many assets while wife was nurse’s aid making
$3.50 an hour); Sogg, 832 P.2d at 785-86 (concerning millionaire husband and wife
who was a sporadically employed country singer).
9. They are in love and suffering from the limits of cognition and bounded
rationality. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995). But see In re Estate of Thies, 903 P.2d 186, 190 (Mont.
1995) (holding the parties “are not assumed to have lost their judgmental faculties
because of their pending marriage”).
10. See, e.g., Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d at 1347.
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intestate shares, allowances, exemptions and homestead. Typically,
11
the parties waive some or all of these rights. The agreement is
executed by the parties before the marriage has begun and
enforced, if at all, when the marriage ends. There is, thus, likely to
be a long time lapse between execution and enforcement during
which the parties’ circumstances may change radically in
unforeseen ways.
While the antenuptial agreement is a contract, it is not an
ordinary contract. Its parties, purpose, subject matter and the time
between execution and enforcement set it apart. This deviation
creates a dilemma for the law. Prospective spouses, of course, have
an interest in making their own bargains and, thereby, settling
rights which might otherwise be litigated. As freely made bargains,
antenuptial agreements should be encouraged and enforced. To
the extent, however, that they are likely to be the product of
overreaching, vary or diminish the state-prescribed protections for
the couple, or may become unfair by the time enforcement is
sought, the law is wary of according them validity. This conflict
makes antenuptial agreements less stable than ordinary contracts
and explains why ordinary contract rules are not sufficient to
contain them. Historically, antenuptial provisions dealing with
death of a spouse have had a better prospect for enforcement than
12
those governing divorce. The latter were at one time considered
13
void ab initio as violative of public policy.
The law has
reconsidered and since about 1970, provisions governing both
types of marital dissolution stand on a more equal footing. Exactly
what that footing is varies from state to state. Generally, courts
facing a challenge to the validity of an antenuptial agreement will
examine the antenuptial agreement more stringently than they
would an ordinary contract. This examination includes the
circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement as well as
the circumstances in which it is sought to be enforced. Courts look
for both procedural and substantive fairness.

11. See, e.g., McAlpine, 679 So. 2d at 91-92; Thies, 903 P.2d at 188.
12. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind. 1996).
13. Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Alaska 1987). See discussion
infra Part II A-C.
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Special Rules of Fairness for Antenuptial Agreements
Procedure
Procedural fairness in this context is generally thought to
mean that the parties entered the agreement voluntarily, after
14
making financial disclosure to each other.
The search for
voluntariness begins as a common law review for fraud,
15
overreaching or sharp dealing, but goes further than the similar
inquiry for ordinary contracts. Courts look at the circumstances of
the parties, their experience, the time of the signing of the
agreement in relation to the wedding and the representation of
16
each party by independent counsel.
The requirement of
disclosure is closely related to voluntariness. Most agreements
contain waivers of marital property rights which cannot be fair or
voluntary if the waiving party has no idea of the other’s assets. The
standard for disclosure varies from state to state, with the relative
17
sophistication of the parties, apparent fairness or unfairness of the
18
terms of the agreement and other circumstances unique to the
19
20
21
litigants. The standard is described variously as “fair,” “full,”
22
23
24
“full and fair,” “material,” and “adequate.” At a minimum, it
should be sufficient to give each party a clear idea of the other’s
25
A simple and effective procedure for ensuring
resources.
26
disclosure is to attach schedules to the agreement itself. A lack of

14. E.g., De Lorean v. De Lorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1986); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984).
15. E.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 733 (Colo. 1982).
16. E.g., Norris v. Norris, 419 A.2d 982, 985 (D.C. 1980).
17. E.g., Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 785 (Nev. 1992) (“Vicky is in
fact extremely unsophisticated with respect to business matters”).
18. E.g., In re the Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1996).
19. E.g., Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn. 1996) (holding
that wife’s cancer illness was a significant factor in determining the agreement’s
validity).
20. E.g., Wiley v. Iverson, 985 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Mont. 1999); In re Thies, 903
P.2d 186, 190 (Mont. 1995).
21. E.g., Sogg, 832 P.2d at 786.
22. E.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990); Randolph, 937
S.W.2d at 817.
23. E.g., Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1994).
24. E.g., In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Iowa 1996).
25. “[A] general knowledge of the true nature and extent of the other’s
property is sufficient.” Id.
26. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d at 821.
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27

disclosure can be overcome by a waiver or a showing that a party
28
had actual knowledge of the other’s assets.
Substance
The review for substantive fairness is more difficult to describe.
As it applies to the terms of the agreement, it is not a substitution
29
of the court’s notions of what is right for the parties’ bargain. It
30
31
is “amorphous,” made on a case by case basis and the standard is
32
33
variously
described
as
“reasonable,”
“fair,”
“not
34
35
unconscionable,” and “equitable,” for example. Substantive
fairness is sometimes measured, along with procedural fairness, at
36
the time of execution of the agreement and, with increasing
37
frequency, at the time of enforcement as well. In making this
review, courts try to avoid hardship visited on a party by unforeseen
consequences of enforcement—for example, a spouse left at a
drastically lower standard of living, unable to provide, or a public
38
charge.
Typical of the broadest review of an antenuptial agreement in
terms of substantive fairness is the Minnesota case of McKee-Johnson
39
v. Johnson, decided in 1989. In it, after finding the agreement
procedurally fair, the Minnesota Supreme Court remanded the
case to the trial court for a review of substantive fairness at both the
time of execution and the time of enforcement. It told the lower
court its job was to review the substantive fairness of the agreement
in light of circumstances at execution by inquiring “into facts
bearing upon the reasonable expectations of each signatory as to
the scope and ultimate effect of the contract” if the marriage ended

27. E.g., Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Minn. 1980).
28. E.g., Randolph, 937 S.W.2d at 817.
29. E.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728,734 (Colo. 1982); Gross v. Gross,
464 N.E.2d 500, 509 (Ohio 1984).
30. Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 551 (Wis. 1986).
31. Id.
32. E.g., In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1996).
33. E.g., Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 785 (Nev. 1992).
34. E.g., Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1022 (R.I. 1994).
35. E.g., Button, 388 N.W.2d at 547.
36. E.g., Penhallow, 649 A.2d at 1021.
37. E.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989);
Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. 1996).
38. E.g., Newman, 653 P.2d at 734-35; Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510.
39. 444 N.W.2d 259.
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40

in divorce. The lower court was to undertake a further substantive
review to determine “what effect, if any, the birth of the parties’
child, and any sequences of that event, significantly resulted in
changed circumstances” that would make “the enforcement . . .
41
oppressive and unconscionable.” The court said it could not state
precise rules for the review to aid the trial courts because each case
hinges on its specific facts. It summed up by saying, “[t]rial courts
engaging in such a review must strike a balance between the law’s
policy favoring freedom of contract between informed consenting
42
adults, and substantive fairness—admittedly a difficult task.”
At the other end of the spectrum on the issue of substantive
43
fairness is the Pennsylvania case of Simeone v. Simeone, decided a
44
year after McKee-Johnson. In it, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
upheld the agreement before it as procedurally fair, but
abandoned its earlier position that it would review antenuptial
agreements for substantive fairness. In its judgment, such a review
at the time of execution severely undermines the functioning and
reliability of an agreement and is, therefore, not a proper subject
45
for judicial inquiry. It also rejected any inquiry into substantive
fairness at the time of enforcement. Although it recognized that
post-execution events like “the possibilities of illness, birth of
children, reliance upon a spouse, career change, financial gain or
46
might cause unfairness at
loss, and numerous other events”
47
enforcement, it declined to review for them. In its view, all such
events are foreseeable; thus, if parties do not include them in their
agreements, they should be seen as having contracted to bear the
48
risks of their occurrence.
Courts should not ignore this “by
proceeding to determine whether a prenuptial agreement was . . .
49
reasonable at the time of its inception or the time of divorce.”

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 267-68.
581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989).
Simeone, 581 A.2d at 166.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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II. THE CASES SINCE SIMEONE
50

Since Simeone, the highest courts of twelve states have decided
fourteen cases in which they ruled on the validity of challenged
antenuptial agreements. A review of these cases shows that courts
continue to scrutinize these agreements for procedural and
substantive fairness. However, one court, after conducting such a
review, expressed its dislike for the process of reviewing for
substance.
A. Substance and Procedure
51

In In re Marriage of Spiegel, decided by the Supreme Court of
Iowa in 1996, the wife attacked the agreement as being
52
procedurally and substantively unfair. The trial court agreed as to
procedural unfairness, finding that it was “gained through fraud,
53
duress, and undue influence.” The husband appealed, relying on
the fact that the prospective wife was represented by counsel who
54
She,
fully advised her of the deficiencies of the agreement.
55
nevertheless, signed it. The Supreme Court disagreed with the
trial court.
It found the agreement “fairly, freely, and
56
despite the fact that the
understandingly entered into,”
57
prospective husband lied about the reasons for wanting it and his
timing presented the prospective wife “with the dilemma of
58
canceling a wedding or submitting to the agreement.” It said,
59
“Sara signed the agreement voluntarily, albeit reluctantly.”
A
dissenting justice, accepting the majority’s facts, thought the
agreement should not be enforced because of the prospective
60
husband’s conduct.
The court found the agreement substantively fair as well. The
50. 581 A.2d 162.
51. 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996).
52. Id. at 316-17.
53. Id. at 313.
54. Id. at 312.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id. at 311, 317.
58. Id. at 317.
59. Id.
60. “A.J.’s conduct and timing robbed Sara of a fair ability to reject the
agreement. Nowithstanding the availability of legal counsel, I think she was,
because of A.J.’s conduct, not equipped to accept her lawyer’s advice.” Id. at 322
(Harris, J., dissenting).
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test, it said, was that “[t]he person challenging the agreement must
prove its terms are unfair or the person’s waiver of rights was not
61
knowing and voluntary . . . .” Further, the court stated, “we hold
the terms of an agreement are fair when the provisions of the
contract are mutual or the division of property is consistent with
62
the financial condition of the parties at the time of execution.”
The court declined to substitute its notions of fairness for the
63
parties’ bargain. It pointed out that the wife did not forfeit all
marital rights, but retained her statutory rights on the husband’s
64
death and received a joint interest in the marital home. Her net
65
In addition, the
worth thus increased during marriage.
relinquishment of marital rights on divorce was mutual, as were all
66
other provisions of the agreement.
Thus, the agreement was
substantively fair. The husband did not suggest in his argument
that the court should abandon its usual review for substantive
fairness; however, the court, noting “that issue is not before us,”
67
It expressed
nevertheless took the occasion to discuss it.
increasing reluctance to review antenuptial agreements for
substance, lamented the “amorphous” nature of such reviews, the
difficulties involved in making them and stated its approval of
68
Simeone v. Simeone. It said:
[a] court should not ignore the parties’ expressed intent
by proceeding to determine whether a prenuptial
agreement was, in the court’s view, reasonable at the time
of inception or the time of divorce. These are exactly the
sorts of judicial determinations that such agreements are
designed to avoid. Rare indeed is the agreement that is
beyond possible challenge when reasonableness is
69
involved.
In three other cases in which the substance of the agreements
was an issue, the courts employed different standards but showed
no reluctance in reviewing for substance. In Sogg v. Nevada State
70
Bank, the Nevada Supreme Court stated the standard as follows:
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 316
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315.
581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d at 315.
832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992).
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antenuptial agreements are
enforceable unless unconscionable, obtained through
fraud, misrepresentation, material nondisclosure or
duress . . . .
Because of the presumed fiduciary
relationship existing between parties who are engaged to
be married, a presumption of fraud has been found where
the agreement entered greatly disfavors one of the
71
parties.
The presumption of fraud arose in this case because the
agreement signed by the prospective wife “left her with no
resources or means of support in the event of divorce, and because
[she] probably would have received more under the community
72
property laws of Nevada . . . .” Because the prospective wife had
not had an opportunity to get the advice of an independent
attorney, was not experienced in business, was pushed into signing
the agreement by the prospective husband and did not have the
benefit of full disclosure of his assets, the presumption was not
73
rebutted and the antenuptial agreement was invalid. The court so
held despite the fact that the parties, when they married, were fiftyfive and eighty-seven, respectively, had been married before and
74
the present marriage lasted a mere eight months.
75
In Penhallow v. Penhallow, the defendant was fifty and the
plaintiff was seventy-eight at the time of the marriage. The plaintiff
had never been married and the defendant had been divorced
76
after twenty-eight years. The present marriage lasted four years.
The plaintiff was not represented by counsel and the agreement,
77
drafted by the defendant’s lawyer, was signed on the day of the
78
wedding.
This case is not in the usual mold in terms of the
parties’ positions or the agreement’s terms. Here, the husband
79
challenged the agreement and the wife sought to enforce it. On

71. Id. at 783-84.
72. Id. at 784.
73. Id. at 785-86.
74. Id. at 782-83.
75. 649 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 1994).
76. Id. at 1018-19.
77. Id. at 1018. It is undisputed that the plaintiff did not have the assistance
of counsel at the time the agreement was signed. Id. at 1022. However, the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act does not require the presence of counsel as a
condition for enforceability of a premarital agreement. Id.
78. Id. at 1018.
79. Id. at 1019.
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80

its face, the agreement was one-sided.
Under the premarital
agreement (1) all the wife’s property was to remain her separate
property; (2) the husband was to transfer all his realty into a
tenancy by the entirety with the wife; and (3) the husband was to
transfer his cash and the contents of his safety deposit boxes into a
joint tenancy with her. If the wife initiated a divorce, separation or
annulment of the marriage, she was required to return all property
81
acquired under the agreement. If, however, the husband initiated
such a proceeding, the wife would retain fifty percent of what she
82
had acquired. The family court invalidated the agreement on the
83
ground that it was unconscionable when executed. Under the
Rhode Island version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act,
unconscionability at execution is not enough to invalidate an
84
agreement.
The challenger must also prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he did not enter into it voluntarily and
that before executing it he was not provided with fair and
reasonable disclosure, did not waive such disclosure or have actual
85
knowledge of the other party’s assets.
This, according to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, the husband failed to do. Thus, it
86
reversed the lower court and found the agreement enforceable.
87
In Matter of the Estate of Lutz, the North Dakota Supreme
Court tested an antenuptial agreement containing mutual waivers
of the prospective spouses’ shares of each other’s estates for
voluntariness and unconscionability at both execution and at
88
enforcement.
The surviving spouse was unrepresented at
89
execution of the agreement but eight months elapsed between
the time she received a draft of it and the time it was executed.
80. Id. at 1018.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1020.
84. Id. at 1021 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 15-17-6(a)(2)(1988)).
85. Id. at 1022.
86. There was an issue about plaintiff’s mental capacity to enter the
agreement in the first place. Husband did not plead incapacity in his complaint;
the trial court refused to consider testimony on the subject and the supreme court
refused to deal with the issue on appeal. Id. at 1023. It seems, however, that
justice was ultimately done when the Rhode Island Supreme Court later held that
defendant’s filing a complaint for protection from abuse constituted an initiation
of the parties’ separation which required her to return all property she acquired
under the antenuptial agreement. Penhallow, 725 A.2d at 896.
87. 620 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 2000).
88. Id. at 595, 596.
89. Id. at 595.
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The court thus found she had had plenty of time to consult her
90
The court also rejected her claims of
own counsel.
91
unconscionability at execution and enforcement. It said, “Lavilla
voluntarily entered into the agreement, and has received exactly
92
what she agreed to receive.”
B. Substance: Alimony Waivers
Alimony (spousal support) has always been a sensitive subject
in the context of antenuptial agreements. Some states have refused
to permit agreements to control the issue holding that provisions
which attempt to do so are void per se. Others have allowed such
provisions, subjecting them to a review for fairness at enforcement.
93
In the ten years since the Simeone case, five of the states’ highest
courts addressed the validity of antenuptial waivers of alimony: the
94
waivers were enforced in all but one case. The California,
95
96
Louisiana, and Tennessee Supreme Courts held that alimony
waivers are no longer void per se, as against public policy, and are,
thus, proper subjects of antenuptial agreements. Each court then
proceeded to uphold the waiver as applied to the particular couple
before it. The Supreme Court of California declined to decide
“whether circumstances existing at the time enforcement of such a
97
waiver is sought might make enforcement unjust.” The majority,
90. Id.
91. Id. at 597.
92. Id.
93. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000); Rider v. Rider, 669
N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996); In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996);
McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85 (La. 1996); Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777
(Tenn. 1996).
94. E.g., Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839.
95. E.g., McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85.
96. E.g., Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777.
97. Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839. In this case each spouse, at the time of dissolution,
had a net worth of approximately $2.5 million. Wife was an aspiring writer with a
master’s degree and two children from an earlier marriage. She declared her
monthly gross income as $5,772 (including $1,352 in social security benefits for
the children). Husband was a businessman with a doctorate in pharmacology and
a law degree; he owned interests in various business ventures and companies.
Each party was represented at execution of the agreement by independent
counsel. Thus the court concluded:
that no public policy is violated by permitting enforcement of a waiver
of spousal support executed by intelligent, well-educated persons, each
of whom appears to be self-sufficient in property and earning ability,
and both of whom have the advice of counsel regarding their rights
and obligations as marital partners at the time they execute the waiver.
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thus, incurred the wrath of the dissenting Justice Kennard who
accused it of abdicating its responsibility for laying out guidelines
to the bench, bar and public “explaining when, if ever, such waivers
98
are enforceable.”
99
100
and Tennessee
made the tests of
Both Louisiana
enforceability of alimony waivers clear. In Louisiana, the supreme
court, reversing the court of appeals, found the waiver did not
violate public policy and would be enforced or not enforced
according to the rules applicable to other contracts, “namely the
Civil Code articles dealing with capacity, consent, error, fraud, and
101
duress.” Applying the Code, the majority upheld the waiver. Two
dissenters thought the prospective wife was coerced. In Tennessee,
the standard laid out by the supreme court is essentially the same as
102
that of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act;
however,
Tennessee has not adopted it. The court said:
So long as the antenuptial agreement was entered into
freely and knowledgeably, with adequate disclosure, and
without undue influence or overreaching, the provision
limiting or waiving alimony will be enforced, with one
exception . . . . The trial court must examine the terms of
the antenuptial agreement at the time of the divorce to
ensure that its enforcement will not result in the spouse
being deprived of alimony, becoming a public charge. If
a spouse would be rendered a public charge by specific
enforcement, the trial court must void the provision and
103
award alimony.
Id. at 848.
98. Id. at 852.
99. E.g., McAlpine, 679 So. 2d at 85.
100. E.g., Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777.
101. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d at 93. In addition to an alimony waiver, the
antenuptial agreement provided for a separate property regime and a lump sum
payment to wife of $25,000 at divorce if the marriage lasted less than six years and
$50,000 if it lasted longer. Id. at 86. If wife contested the alimony waiver the lump
sum payment provisions would be null and void. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 637 So.
2d 1163, 1163-64 (La. Ct. App. 1994). Prospective wife was presented with the
agreement one week before the wedding after the wedding invitations had been
mailed.
Prospective husband was a lawyer and prospective wife was
unrepresented. Neither prospective husband nor his lawyer suggested to her that
she obtain counsel. Two dissenting members of the court thought the agreement
was the product of duress or of overreaching and should not be enforced.
McAlpine, 679 So.2d at 93-94.
102. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1983).
103. Cary, 937 S.W.2d at 781. In the case before it the parties were a forty-twoyear-old lawyer and a thirty-year-old teacher with a Master’s degree and eleven
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The Court upheld the waiver as applied to a wife with teaching
experience.
104
the supreme court, using the test of
In Indiana,
unconscionability at enforcement, reversed two lower courts to
uphold the validity of an alimony waiver. It did so despite the fact
that the wife’s health had deteriorated so badly during the couple’s
four and one-half year marriage that she could no longer work,
enforcement of the waiver might force her to sell her home and
105
her claims for disability and social security had been denied. The
court noted that the wife brought most of the property to the
marriage. At divorce she had assets of at least $65,000 (largely the
value of her house) and received $645 a month in child support
106
from a former spouse. The husband brought into the marriage a
few personal assets and a modest income from more than thirty-five
107
years of work. During the marriage, he retired and at divorce he
had assets worth a few thousand dollars and a pension of $1,247 a
108
month. The court observed that, at the time of execution of the
agreement, the husband was nearing retirement and the wife had
had several surgeries. “If support had been important to either . . .
109
surely it would have been included . . . .” According to the court,
110
“unconscionability involves a gross disparity,” and a finding of it
111
at enforcement requires a comparison of the parties’ situations.
Unfortunately, the comparison the court made was the wrong
one. It compared the financial situations of the parties at
years of teaching experience. Id. at 777. In upholding the alimony waiver the
Court said, “there is nothing in the record to suggest that enforcement of the
agreement will render Cathy Cary, a person with substantial prior teaching
experience, a public charge.” Id. at 782.
104. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996).
105. Id. at 161.
106. Id. at 164.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The court found that:
[e]nforcement of the antenuptial agreement would leave one spouse
with virtually all of the real and personal property, while leaving the
other spouse with a modest income stream. This is what the parties
brought into their short marriage, and this is what they sought to
protect. The alternative, as ordered by the trial court, would provide
[wife] with almost all of the property and a significant percentage of
the income stream. Given [husband’s] limited financial position, we
do not find enforcement to be unconscionable.
Id.
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112

enforcement.
The crucial comparison, however, is between the
challenging party’s expectations at the time of execution and his or
her situation at enforcement. At the time the agreement was
executed, both parties were working, she as an auditor, he at the
same company where he had worked for thirty-five years.
Obviously, the parties did not expect one of them to become
disabled and, thus, unable to work. Accordingly, they did not
provide for it. By the time of enforcement of the agreement, there
was a radical change in Mrs. Rider’s circumstances. The trial court
found enforcement “would leave Mrs. Rider unable to provide for
her reasonable needs,” that she was “not capable of supporting
herself” by earning income and that she did “not possess assets
113
sufficient to provide her with adequate support.”
The supreme
court should have relieved her from the harshness of enforcement,
as had the two lower courts before it.
114
In In re Matter of Spiegel, the Iowa Supreme Court refused to
enforce an alimony waiver even though it was made during a
115
It adhered
period of time when such waivers were permissable.
116
to past and present Iowa law holding that such waivers are void.
Accordingly, the court awarded alimony of $3,000 a month to the
wife, reducing the trial court’s $7,000 a month award by more than
117
one half.
C. Procedure
In six cases, wives challenged the validity of the antenuptial
agreements on procedural grounds alone, namely that the
agreement was not entered into voluntarily and/or that the
prospective husbands failed to disclose. In three of these cases the
challengers were surviving widows and in three they were divorcees.
118
In Matter of Estate of Beesley, the agreement limited the wife’s share
119
of the husband’s estate to fifty percent. The couple met through
120
a personal ad. He lived in Utah and she lived in Texas.
He was
well off with “substantial possessions,” including commercial real
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 161
553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996).
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id. at 320.
883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994).
Id. at 1345.
Id.
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estate, several airplanes and automobiles, as well as investment and
121
retirement income. She was a nurse’s aid earning about $3.50 an
122
123
hour. He flew to Texas to meet her. She agreed to marry him,
124
quit her job and travel with him to Utah. There he asked her to
125
sign an antenuptial agreement. Neither party was represented by
counsel at signing; indeed, the prospective husband had a standard
126
form to which he made several changes.
The prospective wife
127
typed the agreement and both signed it. When the husband died
intestate five years after the marriage the wife challenged the
128
agreement on the grounds that there was no financial disclosure
and that she was coerced into signing it because she had quit her
job, agreed to marry and moved from Texas to Utah before the
129
prospective husband ever raised the issue of such an agreement.
While “material nondisclosure” would ordinarily invalidate an
130
antenuptial agreement, the court found that it did not do so in
this case because the agreement provided the wife with a
131
percentage of the estate rather than a specific sum; there was no
evidence she’d have done anything differently had she known her
132
husband’s net worth;
and her share under the agreement
exceeded the amount she would have received under Utah’s
133
elective share statutes. The court also rejected the wife’s claim of
134
involuntariness, accepting the lower court’s findings of fact.
In
135
Matter of Estate of Thies, both parties waived their elective shares
136
under the antenuptial agreement.
Upon the husband’s death
the wife challenged this provision as it applied to her, based upon
137
The agreement itself acknowledged that
his failure to disclose.
the parties had fully disclosed to each other; however, there were
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1349.
903 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1995).
Id. at 187.
Id.
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138

no lists of assets or values attached to it.
The court nevertheless
139
Justice
found the statutory test of “fair disclosure” satisfied.
140
Leaphart dissented,
pointing out that the agreement was
prepared by the husband’s attorney who testified that at the fifteenminute meeting to discuss and sign it, neither he nor the
141
prospective husband disclosed husband’s assets to the wife.
She
142
was not represented by counsel and had not read the agreement.
In the dissenter’s view, “Montana is now alone in holding that the
test of ‘fair disclosure’ can be satisfied with a mere recitation of
disclosure in the absence of any financial information from
143
independent sources or other mitigating circumstances.” In Wiley
144
v. Iverson, the Montana Supreme Court again considered the
validity of an antenuptial waiver of a widow’s rights. Again, the
agreement alleged disclosure but the schedules showing the
prospective husband’s assets were not attached to it when the
145
prospective wife read it.
The court reaffirmed its decision in
146
Thies and its language from the earlier case:
Fair disclosure contemplates that each spouse should be
given information, of a general and approximate nature,
concerning the net worth of the other. Each party has a
duty to consider and evaluate the information received before
signing an agreement since they are not assumed to have lost
their judgmental facilities because of their pending
147
marriage.
148
It again upheld the agreement.
Significantly, Justice
149
Leaphart now concurred in the judgment, presumably because
the wife and husband had worked together for years before
deciding to marry and the wife was close to the husband’s family
150
even before the marriage. Thus, she had actual knowledge of his

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id.
985 P.2d 1176 (Mont. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 1181 (citing holding of Thies, 903 P.2d at 190).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1181-82.
Id. at 1182.
See id. at 1181.
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151

assets and sources of income.
152
In Randolph v. Randolph, the challenge was based on the
argument that the husband failed to disclose and the wife, thus, did
not have enough information to enter the agreement
153
“knowledgeably.”
According to the Tennessee Supreme Court,
“knowledgeably” means:
that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial
agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the
nature, extent and value of his or her holdings was
provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or
that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse
seeking to avoid the agreement had independent
knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the
154
proponent spouse’s holdings.
In this case the parties, C.L. and Virginia, were fifty-two and
155
forty-six respectively.
He had been married five times before
156
while she had been married once and had a thirteen-year-old son.
The couple, and Virginia’s son, lived together for about a year
157
At the time, she had “virtually no assets”
before the marriage.
and he had substantial real estate holdings and a net worth of
158
about $500,000 to $600,000. Virginia testified that she had never
seen the agreement until the day she signed it—one day before the
159
wedding.
The agreement, apparently, recited that she had
160
Neither did
independent counsel but, in actuality, she did not.
she have actual knowledge of C.L.’s assets and he made no
161
disclosure. The court stated that he was “a learned businessman
162
very shrewd in his dealings.” She had no business experience or
163
knowledge. She was suffering from breast cancer at the time she
164
signed the agreement and was responsible for a minor child. She
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id.
937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996).
Id. at 817.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 818, 822.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.
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testified that her only choice was to sign the agreement or be
thrown out of the residence she and her son had shared with C.L.
165
The trial and appellate courts all agreed
for the previous year.
166
that the antenuptial agreement should not be enforced.
167
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in a four to
three decision, upheld the validity of an antenuptial agreement
which, though it did not mention the word “divorce,” operated to
deprive the wife of any marital property. The wife challenged it as
the product of fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching by husband.
The prospective husband was represented by a partner of the
attorney who represented the prospective wife in her previous
168
divorce. The wife was told that she could have independent legal
169
counsel but she declined.
The agreement was executed the day
170
The majority of the court laid down the
before the wedding.
rules it purportedly applied:
When
an
antenuptial
agreement
provides
disproportionately less than the party challenging it would
have received under an equitable distribution, the burden
is on the one claiming the validity of the contract to show
that the other party entered into it with the benefit of full
knowledge or disclosure of the assets of the proponent.
The burden of proving fraud, duress, coercion or
overreaching, however, remains with the party
171
challenging the agreement.
The court further stated that “the party financially
disadvantaged must have a meaningful opportunity to consult with
172
counsel.”
There was no issue of disclosure since schedules were
attached to the agreement. The issue was overreaching. The
burden of proof was on the wife. The majority acknowledged that
certain facts gave weight to the wife’s argument: the agreement
never mentioned divorce, the relationship between the attorney
who represented prospective wife in her earlier divorce and the
attorney who drafted the agreement may have led her to trust him
unduly and the antenuptial agreement was presented to her on the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id. at 823.
628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994).
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
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173

eve of the wedding.
The court, nevertheless, upheld the
agreement. The dissenters thought the agreement “should be
unenforceable since its terms were unclear, the circumstances
evidence that it was not entered into freely without fraud, duress,
coercion, or overreaching, and . . . [husband] attempt[ed] to use it
to deny [wife] her right to share in property acquired by the couple
174
during their marriage.”
175
176
In Randolph and Sogg. v. Nevada State Bank, the only two of
these fourteen cases in which the agreements were invalidated, the
courts characterized the parties relationship as “confidential,” or
177
“fiduciary:” they, thus, owed each other “the utmost good faith.”
178
Most jurisdictions agree.
California, however, repudiates such a
179
view of the parties. Thus, in In re Marriage of Bonds, a foreignborn, unrepresented wife who signed an antenuptial agreement on
the eve of her wedding to a major league baseball player was held
not entitled to have the voluntariness of the agreement assessed on
the assumption of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between
180
the parties. It was, thus, not subject to strict scrutiny even though
she, the less-sophisticated party, did not have independent counsel,
waived all her marital rights, husband’s annual salary had grown
from $106,000 at execution of the agreement to $8,000,000 at
dissolution of the marriage and the agreement itself was a
shambles—no original was presented at trial and what was
181
presented was incomplete and filled with mistakes. The supreme
court accepted the trial court’s conclusion that the prospective wife
182
entered the agreement voluntarily, reversing the intermediate
183
court which disagreed. The supreme court said:
Because the Uniform Act was intended to enhance the
enforceability of premarital agreements, because it
expressly places the burden of proof upon the person
challenging the agreement, and finally because the
California statute imposing fiduciary duties in the family
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1347-48.
Id. at 1350 (emphasis in original).
937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996).
832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992).
Randolph, 937 S.W.2d at 819.
See supra note 7.
5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000).
Id. at 831.
Bonds v. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 787, 789, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
Bonds, 5 P.3d at 833-34.
Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787.
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law setting applies only to spouses, we do not believe that
the commissioners of our Legislature contemplated that
the voluntariness of a premarital agreement would be
examined in light of the strict fiduciary duties imposed on
persons such as lawyers, or imposed expressly by statute
184
upon persons who are married.
III. THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT AND THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
California was the first state to adopt the Uniform Premarital
185
although it, like a number of other
Agreement Act,
186
jurisdictions, modified it to conform more closely to its own prior
187
law.
Since California’s adoption in 1985, twenty-five states
followed suit. The Act is now law in whole or part in some twenty188
189
six states. The last adoptions were Texas and Indiana in 1997.
190
As the California Supreme Court pointed out in the Bonds case,
the Act was intended to enhance the enforceability of antenuptial
191
agreements. To that end, it specifically included spousal support
192
as a permissible subject for antenuptial agreement and attempted
to circumscribe courts in their reviews of these agreements for
procedural and substantive fairness. Under it, a spouse could avoid
enforcement of an antenuptial agreement only by proving that at
the time of execution it (1) was not voluntary, or (2) that it was
193
194
unconscionable, there was no reasonable financial disclosure,
the right to disclosure was not waived and that the challenger did

184. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 832.
185. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369-80 (1983 & Supp.
2001).
186. Id. at 372 (Supp. 2001).
187. California deleted subdivision (a)(4) from §3 of the UPAA; this section
would have permitted the parties to contract with respect to modification or
elimination of spousal support.
It also eliminated §6(b) providing for
modification of alimony or support waivers, which, if enforced, would cause a
spouse to become a public charge. Pendleton v. Fireman, 5 P.3d 839, 841 (Cal.
2000); Bonds, 5 P.3d at 822.
188. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 147 (Supp. 2001).
189. Id.
190. 5 P.3d at 832.
191. Id. at 832.
192. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373-74 (1983 & Supp.
2001).
193. Id. § 6.
194. Id.
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not have independent knowledge of the other party’s finances.
The Act also limited the review at enforcement to provisions
waiving or modifying spousal support rights which, if enforced,
196
would result in making a spouse eligible for public assistance. It
197
of course, and whether it has
has been roundly criticized,
accomplished its goals in the adopting jurisdictions is hard to
determine. As one reads through the cases one is still struck by the
uncertainty of enforcement of these agreements and the lack of
198
uniformity in result, not only from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but
among trial and appellate courts ruling on the same facts in the
same case and in the same state.
Enter then, the American Law Institute, with its new Principles
199
of Family Dissolution.
The Principles provide procedural
200
requirements for antenuptial agreements of the sort already
201
required by most, if not all, states.
These requirements are a
202
203
signed writing, financial disclosure and a showing of informed
204
The latter is the rough
consent not obtained under duress.
equivalent of the common law and Uniform Act requirements of
205
voluntariness.
The Reporters justify the new language by stating
their desire to focus the courts’ attention on the tactics of the
proponent of the agreement rather than on the state of mind of
the challenger; however, the change seems little more than a
206
misguided example of “elegant variation.” The Principles raise a
presumption of informed consent and the absence of duress if the
195. Id.
196. Id. §§ 3, 6.
197. Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127 (1993) (discussing the conflicts between
the Act and modern law and concluding that the Act promotes contractual
autonomy); Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, supra note 4, at 1086-90
(criticizing the Act and discussing improvement by the addition of five new
amendments).
198. Compare Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992) (concluding
that prospective husband’s overreaching rendered the agreement involuntary and
invalid) with Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994) (upholding
agreement as valid even though prospective husband’s overreaching rendered the
agreement involuntary).
199. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6.
200. Id. § 7.05.
201. See id. § 7.05 Reporter’s Notes.
202. Id. § 7.05(1).
203. Id. § 7.05(5).
204. Id. § 7.05(2).
205. Id. § 7.05, cmt. b.
206. JACQUES BARZUN, SIMPLE & DIRECT: A RHETORIC FOR WRITERS 108 (1975).
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agreement was executed at least thirty days before the parties’
207
marriage, both parties were advised to obtain legal counsel and
208
had opportunity to do so.
In an important departure from
existing law, the Principles put the burden of proving the lack of
duress and the presence of consent on the party who is trying to
209
enforce the agreement.
The Reporters hope that this change in
210
the usual contract rule will “caution[] the stronger party against
overreaching tactics that would make this burden of proof more
211
difficult to meet.” Had this provision been in effect in Louisiana
and Ohio, it might well have changed the results in a number of
212
In cases where one party did not have
the cases discussed.
independent counsel, for the presumption to arise, the agreement
must contain understandable language explaining the significance
of its terms and the fact that the parties’ interests may be adverse
213
with respect to them.
It is on the subject of substantive fairness that the principles
are most remarkable. They depart from the Uniform Act and the
common law by omitting any requirement of substantive fairness at
the time of execution of an antenuptial agreement. If contained in
a signed writing and entered with disclosure, without duress and
with informed consent, the agreement satisfies the test at execution
no matter how one-sided or unfair its terms. At enforcement,
however, the Principles call for a wider substantive review of these
214
215
agreements than called for by the Uniform Act.
They, thus,
216
move closer to McKee-Johnson v. Johnson
and the Minnesota
standard.
The Principles would prohibit enforcement of
antenuptial agreements whenever enforcement would “work a
217
substantial injustice.”
Here, again, the Principles opt for new
language abandoning the old standard of unconscionableness at
207. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.05(3)(a).
208. Id. § 7.05(3)(b).
209. Id. § 7.05(2).
210. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994).
211. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.05, cmt. b.
212. E.g., McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85 (La. 1996); Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d
1343.
213. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.05(3)(c)(1)-(2).
214. Id. § 7.07.
215. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(B), 9B U.L.A. 373-74 (1983 & Supp.
2001).
216. 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989) (holding that substantive fairness
requirements should be examined both at inception and at dissolution).
217. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.07(1).
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enforcement. They lay out guidelines to help Courts in applying
the new language. Before making any inquiry into the effects of
enforcement, under the Principles, one of three prerequisites must
be present: the passage of a certain number of years after
218
execution; or the birth or adoption of a child to parties who had
219
no children at execution; or a significant, unexpected change in
220
circumstances since execution.
If one of these events has
occurred the court can consider whether the enforcement of the
221
agreement would work a substantial injustice.
Again, in an
attempt to help courts with the inquiry, the Principles lay out a
number of factors which courts already consider: the disparity of
outcome under the agreement and under the marital property
222
regime; the likely circumstances of the party challenging the
223
agreement had the marriage never taken place; whether the
agreement was designed to benefit or protect the interests of third
224
parties; and the impact of its enforcement on post-execution
225
Overall, the Principles are to be applauded for
children.
incorporating the best practices of the courts and trying to tread a
middle ground between those who would refuse to enforce
antenuptial agreements altogether and those who would enforce
226
them as ordinary business contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION: DRAFTING FOR VALIDITY
Whatever the exact fairness rules are in any particular
jurisdiction, predictability remains an attainable goal in the
drafting of antenuptial agreements. The parties and their lawyers
have complete control over the circumstances surrounding
execution of the agreement as well as its contents. Both parties
should be represented by independent counsel who see that the
218. Id. § 7.07 (2)(a).
219. Id. § 7.07(2)(b).
220. Id. § 7.07(2)(c).
221. Id. § 7.07(2).
222. Id. § 7.07(3)(a).
223. Id. § 7.07(3)(b).
224. Id. § 7.07(3)(c).
225. Id. § 7.07(3)(d).
226. “This Chapter takes a position between the English rule that premarital
contracts are not binding, and that the recent statements of some American courts
that these contracts should be enforced as ordinary business contracts. This
intermediate position is in fact consistent with the actual practice of many, if not
most, American courts.” Unfortunately the Principles don’t apply to agreements
that govern death of a spouse. Id. § 7.02 cmt. a.
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parties make full disclosure to each other. As the California
227
Supreme Court said in the Bonds case, “the best assurance of
228
enforceability is independent representation for both parties,”
229
and the Supreme Court of Tennessee said in Randolph, “a fairly
simple and effective method of proving disclosure is to attach a net
worth schedule of assets, liabilities, and income to the agreement
230
itself.”
Lawyers should see to it that both parties have counsel.
231
They should do so for their own benefit as well as for the benefit
of their clients. They should incorporate schedules of the parties’
assets into the agreement, review it for fairness, urge the parties to
revise patently unfair provisions and explain in the agreement any
which remain. If these guidelines are followed, the agreement will
be fairly procured and substantively fair at execution. As simple as
these precautions seem to be, the cases show that many lawyers
ignore them. In eleven of the fourteen cases discussed in this
article, the parties challenging the agreement were not represented
232
by independent counsel at execution. In two cases, whether the
challenging party had been represented or not is not apparent
233
from the reports. In one case, neither party had counsel. In at
234
of the cases, the agreements did not incorporate
least five
schedules of assets. Perhaps a prime example of how not to do it
235
comes from the Bonds case.
The agreement was apparently a
236
contained “numerous
“thing of shreds and patches,”
typographical errors,” referred to “schedules” of separate property
237
but none were attached.
The prospective wife was not
represented. The supreme court said “there is evidence that Barry
227. Bonds v. Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000).
228. Id. at 833.
229. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996).
230. Id. at 821.
231. So as to avoid any arguments that they owe a duty to the unrepresented
party or are engaged in a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Bonds, 5 P.3d at 883; Lutz v.
Lutz, 620 N.W.2d 589, 594 (R.I. 2000); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3
(1983).
232. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996); Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777
(Tenn. 1996).
233. Estate of Beesley v. Harris, 833 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994).
234. Bonds, 5 P.3d 815; Estate of Thies v. Lowe, 903 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1995);
Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992); Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815;
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343.
235. 5 P.3d 815.
236. Gilbert and Sullivan, A Wandering Minstrel I, from The Mikado, lyrics in
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN AT HOME 152 (1927).
237. Bonds v. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr.2d 783, 788-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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did not understand the legal fine points of the agreement any
238
No “responsible attorney could have
more than Sun did.”
239
reasonably predicted” that this agreement would be enforced.
Yet the court upheld it as voluntarily entered into and valid.
As to the substantive fairness of an agreement at enforcement,
it is obvious that no lawyer or party can control future events. The
birth of a child or changes in a spouse’s financial status,
employability or health after execution may make enforcement of
the agreement seem unfair even though it was fairly procured and
substantively fair when executed. The key to softening the impact
of post-execution events is to foresee their possible occurrence and
240
241
to provide for them.
The Rider case is another prime example
of how not to do it. At the time the agreement was executed, both
parties were working. Obviously, the parties did not expect one of
them to become disabled and did not provide for it. They should
242
have foreseen that possibility and planned for it. Had they done
so, certainly it would have enhanced the stability of their
agreement. Two courts held it unenforceable but the Supreme
243
Court of Indiana mistakenly upheld it. The lesson to learn from
this review is that lawyers are making unnecessary mistakes and so
are courts. Lawyers are allowing parties to go unrepresented, not
attaching asset schedules to their agreements, failing to plan for
foreseeable events and engaging in sloppy drafting. Courts,
perhaps brain-washed by the hyperbole accompanying the Uniform
Act, are enforcing agreements they should set aside. The ALI
Principles with their emphasis on representation and the review for
substance at enforcement, may herald a much needed
improvement in lawyering and judging in this field. It remains to
be seen if they will be followed.

238. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 837. See also Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348
(Ohio 1994) (“Prenuptial agreements are often drafted in such a way as to be
nearly incomprehensible to a layperson.”).
239. Bonds, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d at 803.
240. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982);
Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va.
1985).
241. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996).
242. Id. at 164.
243. See supra notes 104-13.
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